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1. Introduction 
 
While the essential role context plays in the understanding of expressions and utterances 
has never been questioned, the way it is perceived has evolved from a static factor 
established prior to the process of utterance interpretation, indeed a prerequisite for 
processing information, to a dynamic entity which emerges in this process. The latter 
view is espoused by relevance theorists, who define context as “the set of premises used 
in interpreting an utterance” (Sperber and Wilson 1986/95: 15) and treat it as a mental 
construct undergoing diverse modifications as the comprehender of an utterance 
processes and interprets incoming verbal information and other communicative signals 
supplied by the communicator.  
The aim of this paper is to consider the usefulness of this model of context for 
analyzing the derivation of meaning in puns, i.e. utterances in which, instead of its usual 
function of allowing the comprehender to resolve ambiguities ubiquitous in language 
and communication, the context plays a different role of leading him to entertain, and 
often to accept two diverse readings.  
The paper will start with a brief characterization of the most striking features of puns 
(in section 2), followed by the discussion (in section 3) of the limitations of the most 
widely accepted approach to pun comprehension, namely Attardo’s (1994) connector-
disjunctor model. In section 4 the notion of context as it is understood in relevance 
theory will be examined, and its potential for accountingcc for the key properties of puns 
(the oscillating effect and the ‘connecting’ role of the pivotal expression) will be put to 
the test in sections 5 and 6. The paper will close with a handful of concluding remarks. 
 
 
2. Key features of puns 
 
Punning can be characterized as relying for its effect on correlating distinct meanings in 
one linguistic form. This unique property of puns is achieved by diverse structural and 
lexical means, the systematic study of which has yielded equally diverse pun 
classifications (e.g. Heller 1994; Attardo 1994 and references therein, Tanaka 1994; Yus 
2003), and is grounded in the ambiguity of the pun’s pivotal section, variously described 
as the punning element or the connector. The long list of multiple meanings it engenders 
includes cases of homonymy, as in (1), polysemy, as in (2), metaphor, as in (3), perfect 
388 Agnieszka Solska 
homophony, as in (4), imperfect homophony, as in (5), paronymy, as in (6), and 
homography, as in (7).  
 
(1) Being in politics is just like playing golf: you are trapped in one bad lie after 
another. 
(2) There was a sign on the lawn at a drug re-hab centre that said “Keep Off The 
Grass.” 
(3) Never invest in funerals, it’s a dying industry. 
(4) Everybody kneads it. (An advertising slogan for Pillsbury flour) [kneads/needs] 
(5) Mud, Sweat and Gears. (The name of a bicycle repair shop) [mud/blood, 
gears/tears] 
(6) The Crime of Pun-ishment. (Title of an essay on puns) 
(7) Poland Polishes Off U.S. Volleyball Team. (The Daily Herald June 17, 2011) 
 
Combinations of these are not are uncommon, as could be seen in (8), which combines 
homophony with metaphor, as are cases where lexical ambiguity is mixed with structural 
ambiguity, such as (9):  
 
(8) When it pours it reigns. (Advertising slogan for Michelin tyres)  
(9) After he ate the duck, the alligator got a little down in the mouth.  
 
Deriving and juxtaposing the pun’s two meanings is effected in a rather straightforward 
way in the so-called horizontal, or syntagmatic puns, such as (10), in which the 
connector appears more than once, on each occasion in a different syntactic role and 
carrying a different sense. Since the repeated occurrence of the punning element openly 
points to the punning intention of the communicator, puns of this sort are sometimes 
described as explicit. 
 
(10) Some men are wise and some are otherwise.  
 
A more ingenious way of deriving and juxtaposing meanings takes place in vertical, or 
paradigmatic puns, such as (1) – (9) above, in which a single ostensive signal is 
supposed to communicate more than one meaning. Puns of this sort are sometimes called 
implicit as there is no guarantee that the interpreter will in fact become aware of the 
intended duality of meaning. If he does, the potential ambiguities of the pun’s pivotal 
part will remain unresolved and the comprehender will end up swinging back and forth 
between two interpretations. 
This oscillating effect is the key feature of puns regardless of whether the two 
interpretations involved are equally valid (as is the case with the so-called double 
retentions puns) or not (as is the case with the so-called single retention puns). For 
instance, the comprehender of (1) is forced to oscillate between two perfectly legitimate 
senses of the noun lie, i.e. ‘deliberate untruth’ and ‘a position of a golf ball.’ In (3), the 
only viable meaning of the word dying is metaphorical, but the special appeal of the 
utterance lies in the fact that the word is used to describe an industry which specializes in 
burying or cremating people who are dead in the literal sense of the word. Thus even in 
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single retention puns the extraneous meaning does not completely evaporate but lingers 
in the interpreter’s mind as the pun-creating counterpoise to the valid meaning.1 
 
 
3. The limitations of the conjuctor-disjunctor model of pun 
comprehension  
 
Researchers studying puns (Redfern 1982, 1984, 1996; Norrick 1984; Zwicky and 
Zwicky 1986; Sobkowiak 1991; Tanaka 1992, 1994; Attardo 1994; Giora 1997, 2003; 
Yus, 2003; van Mulken, et al. 2005; Partington 2009) have always emphasized the role 
of context in leading the addressee to derive and contrast the pun’s two meanings. 
Indeed, puns have been described as “the product(s) of a context deliberately constructed 
to enforce an ambiguity” (Attridge 1988: 141). An interesting attempt to systematize this 
role can be found in Attardo (1994), who outlined what could be called a connector-
disjunctor model of humorous texts and who applied it to humorous puns. Identifying 
the disjunction of meaning and the conjunction of form as the two main properties of 
ambiguity-based humorous texts including puns, Attardo argued (1994: 134) that “[t]he 
presence of humorous ambiguity is brought about and resolved (i.e. revealed, or made 
explicit) by two functional elements in the text”: the conjunction of form is made 
possible thanks to the connector, i.e. “the ambiguous element of the utterance which 
makes the presence of two senses possible” (1994: 134), while the disjunction of 
meaning is achieved thanks to the disjunctor, i.e. the element which forces the passage 
from one interpretation to another. The presence of these two, according to Attardo, 
constitutes the necessary and the sufficient conditions for the punning effect to arise.  
Attardo’s main focus was on puns used as humorous texts, such as (11), so he did not 
try to extend his observations to all kinds of puns, not all of which are humorous. It can 
be argued, however, that his conjunctor-disjunctor model can be applied to other texts 
that exploit ambiguity regardless of whether they are humorous or not, as long as they 
depend for their effect on correlating two diverse meanings in one linguistic form. 
Indeed, Bucaria (2004) put the model to use in her discussion of punning newspaper 
headlines, such as (12): 
 
(11) Why did the cookie cry? Because her mother has been away for so long. [a wafer] 
(Attardo 1994: 128, after Pepicello and Green 1983: 59) 
(12) DRUNK GETS NINE MONTHS IN VIOLIN CASE (Bucaria 2004: 291)  
 
Both in Attardo’s discussion of humorous puns and in Bucaria’s analysis of ambiguous 
headlines (both punning and not) context is understood in a mechanistic way mainly as 
discourse that surrounds a language unit, though sporadically they also mention non-
linguistic factors which enforce the ambiguity of the pun’s connector, such as the 
situation in which the speech event is taking place. For instance, discussing the pun in 
(13) Attardo feels it necessary to specify the circumstances in which it appeared and 
Bucaria (2004: 282) bemoans the fact that the “analysis of headlines collected on web 
                                               
1 For the discussion of the continued availability of the extraneous meaning in single retention 
puns see Solska (forthcoming a). 
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sites is complicated by the absence of the context in which the headlines originally 
appeared, which could have provided useful information for their semantic 
disambiguation.” 
 
(13) Context: on a birthday card there is a picture of a beautiful woman holding a 
birthday cake. The legend reads: 
“You can’t have your cake and Edith [eat it] too.” (Attardo 1994: 149) 
 
Interestingly, neither Attardo nor Bucaria mentions the knowledge possessed by the 
comprehender as a factor which might be crucial in allowing him to establish the second, 
less obvious, interpretation of the connector despite the fact that punning jokes and 
newspaper headlines whose comprehension depends on the addressee’s encyclopedic 
knowledge are not unusual. For instance, the joke in (14) can only be understood by 
those who know that American one cent coins bear the image of Abraham Lincoln’s 
profile and full appreciation of the punning headline in (15) depends on the addressee’s 
familiarity with the title of Shakespeare’s comedy Much Ado About Nothing. In puns like 
these, the connector’s double meaning can only be recognised by those who have access 
to information that can be obtained neither from the speech situation nor from whatever 
linguistic material precedes or follows the connector. 
 
(14) Which president was least guilty? Lincoln. He is in a cent. [in a cent/innocent]  
(15) Much Ado About Muffin at BA. (Headline of an article in The Sun about a British 
Airways flight attendant suspended for stealing a muffin that a passenger left 
uneaten on his tray) 
 
Attardo and Bucaria never describe extra-linguistic factors as possible disjunctors, which 
makes the connector-disjunctor vision of context in pun comprehension somewhat 
incomplete. If we look further afield, we can easily notice that in many communicative 
settings extra-linguistic disjunctors, making a reader or hearer aware of another, less 
salient, sense of a key expression, are quite common. For instance, the punning character 
of (5) above is apparent only to those who have heard of Winston Churchill’s famous 
“Blood, sweat and tears” speech or at least to those who have heard of the American 
music group by the same name. The message in (16) would be incomprehensible and its 
similarity to the common expression “Come what may” would pass unnoticed if it did 
not appear in a sign over a restaurant. In much the same way, in (17), the less salient 
meaning of the word cover, i.e. ‘cover-as-wrap,’ is brought to the reader’s attention by a 
picture showing various objects (among them a chair, a lobster, a bottle and a watering 
can) wrapped in newspaper sheets.  
 
(16) Cumquat May. (Name of a vegetarian restaurant) 
(17) And you thought we only covered business. (Advertisement for Financial Times 
Weekend) 
 
However, the limited view of context is not the most serious problem of the connector-
disjunctor model of understanding puns. What seems puzzling is that it acknowledges 
and identifies by name only two key ingredients underlying the punning effect and 
shows no appreciation for the fact that if two meanings are correlated in the pun’s 
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connector, each of them must be linked to some element in the pun or outside it. This 
indicates that apart from the connector and the element causing passage from one 
meaning to another, there has to be another element, namely one that has caused the first 
meaning to emerge. In other words, the problem with the conjunctor-disjunctor model is 
that it focuses on establishing the pun’s second, less accessible meaning, and takes the 
first, more accessible meaning, for granted.  
Both Attardo and Bucaria seem to assume that the more accessible meaning is simply 
conveyed by the connector. Among the different possible connector-disjunctor 
configurations to be found in punning jokes and punning headlines, they mention a ‘non-
distinct connector-disjunctor configuration,’ in which the connector and the disjunctor 
coincide in one portion of the text. Bucaria (2004: 299) points to the headline in (12) as 
an example of an utterance exhibiting such a configuration. Undoubtedly, in utterance 
(12), the switch from one meaning of the word case to another cannot take place until 
the world is actually encountered. However, the ‘container’ meaning of this word is 
clearly motivated by presence of the concept VIOLIN, while the other meaning of case, 
i.e. ‘case-as-lawsuit,’ by whatever information can be gleaned from the phrase ‘gets nine 
months.’ Attardo quotes utterance (13) as an example of a pun in which the connector 
doubles up as the conjunctor. However, there can be no doubt that one of the meanings 
to be juxtaposed here is explicitly conveyed by the utterance itself, while the other one 
has to be retrieved from memory and will only be supplied by those who are familiar 
with the proverb “You can’t have you cake and eat it.” Thanks to its phonetic similarity 
to the predicate eat it, the pivotal word Edith does act as a switch between meanings 
since it allows the hearer to identify eat it as the ‘target’ expression with which the 
explicitly conveyed concept is to be contrasted, but the identification can only be made if 
the comprehender has heard of the pertinent proverb. 
The conclusion one might draw from such examples is that when describing the role 
of the contextual factors triggering the punning effect it would make more sense to 
identify not two but three essential elements in puns: the connector and two pun-
creating, or ‘disjuncting,’ elements, which can but do not have to be linguistic in nature 
and which are like two forces pulling the comprehender in two opposite directions. 
Another drawback of the model is that while it emphasizes the ‘connecting role’ of 
the pun’s ambiguity carrying fragment, it offers no tools for specifying which aspects of 
its meaning are in fact responsible for its ‘connecting’ role. Attardo invokes sound 
symbolism and the human tendency to believe that identically (or similar) sounding 
expressions are supposed to carry identical (or similar) meanings. The problem is that in 
puns identical (or similar) sounding expressions, instead of conveying identical (or 
similar) meanings, somehow end up conveying meanings that are anything but similar.  
In what follows I hope to demonstrate that the relevance-theoretic model of context 
provides better tools for explaining the source of the oscillating effect in puns and for 
how it is possible for one fragment of a punning utterance to serve as a pivot linking 
diverse meanings. 
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4. Sperber and Wilson’s dynamic view of context 
 
Sperber and Wilson, the founders of Relevance Theory, forcefully argue (1986/1995: 
132-142) for what might be called a cognitive view of context. In their inferential model 
of human communication, set within a broader cognitive framework, context is 
understood as the information available for processing an utterance, information that can 
be gleaned from diverse sources including but not limited to the discourse preceding the 
linguistic material being processed or the physical setting in which communication is 
taking place. The extra- and intra-linguistic sources of contextual information would also 
include “expectations about the future, scientific hypotheses or religious beliefs, 
anecdotal memories, general cultural assumptions, beliefs about the mental state of the 
speaker” (Sperber & Wilson 1986/1995:15-16). Yet another source of contextual 
information is the assumptions stored under the encyclopedic entries of the concepts 
made accessible to the comprehender by the words he will decode while processing the 
utterance. This sort of information is always used in fleshing out utterance meaning and 
is of particular importance in the case of puns, many of which tend to be autonomous, 
self-contained texts. Its vital role underlying the ‘connecting’ function of the connector 
will be discussed in section 6. 
In the process of working out utterance meaning the comprehender starts off from 
what Sperber and Wilson call the initial context, which is available to the comprehender 
before an utterance is produced and which consists of the assumptions remaining in the 
comprehender’s memory from whatever deductive process has just taken place. In other 
words, it is made up of propositions that are linked to whatever provided cognitive 
effects prior to the hearing of this utterance. As soon as the first lexical item of a new 
utterance is produced, the comprehender’s first step is to select from the initial context 
the propositions that he finds relevant to the concept communicated by the item just 
uttered, i.e. whatever propositions will allow him to modify some element(s) in his 
current cognitive environment. As the utterance unfolds, newly communicated 
assumptions, i.e. background assumptions which the utterance has made accessible, will 
move to the foreground, while others will drop into the background.  
The ever-changing context is thus whatever set of assumptions is active at a given 
time. The assumptions it consists of, often referred to as background or contextual 
assumptions, are thus assumptions manifest to the hearer, i.e. assumptions which the 
hearer is able to mentally represent to himself, which may but do not have to represent 
the actual state of the world and which constitute input to the inferential, i.e. deductive 
processes of utterance interpretation.  
What governs the choice of the contextual subset of assumptions at any given 
moment is relevance, the key notion in the theory, understood as a trade-off between the 
cognitive gain achieved by processing the incoming input and the processing effort 
needed to achieve that gain. In keeping with the communicative principle of relevance,2 
an assumption is judged as relevant if it brings in cognitive effects which the hearer 
perceives as adequate in the view of the effort he has expended to derive them.  
 
                                               
2 “Every act of ostensive communication conveys a presumption of its own optimal relevance” 
(Sperber &Wilson 1986/1995: 260). 
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5. The comprehender’s cognitive environment as the ambiguity 
enforcing factor in puns 
 
To see how this dynamic model of context outlined above might account for the way 
meanings in puns are derived, interpreted and processed, let us consider utterance (1),3 
consisting of a lead-up clause ‘Being in politics is just like playing golf’ followed by the 
punning clause ‘you are trapped in one bad lie after another.’ By the time the 
comprehender encounters the subject pronoun you in its second clause, he will have at 
his disposal an initial context consisting of assumptions which have been made available 
by the first utterance and which are connected with whatever he believes is involved in 
‘being in politics’ and whatever he knows about ‘playing golf.’ These assumptions may 
include those listed in (18): 
 
(18) a. Being in politics involves … 
running for office, 
trying to get support of the voters, 
delivering speeches, 
making promises,  
winning or losing elections. 
b. Playing golf involves … 
using a club to hit a small ball into holes in the ground, 
being a member of a golf club, 
spending time outdoors, 
going to the golf links, 
winning or losing games. 
 
In additions to these, the initial context will also include the idea (made available by the 
concept LIKE) that the producer of (1) perceives a similarity between the two spheres of 
life mentioned in the lead-up clause, and the expectation that this similarity will be 
explained in the utterance that follows. As the second part of the utterance progresses, 
some of these assumptions will become more prominent, some less, and totally new 
assumptions will emerge based on whatever information the second clause will reveal, 
i.e. based on the information explicitly and implicitly conveyed by the utterance. The 
process of identifying these two kinds of meanings will require decoding the verbal input 
into a structured set of concepts, i.e. recognizing mentally represented concepts 
associated with the words and expressions used in the utterance as well as identifying its 
logical form, resolving any undeterminacies its component concepts exhibit, and finally, 
establishing whatever meanings the utterance may imply.  
Engaged in this process the comprehender will form and test hypotheses against the 
information making up the initial context described above. Specifically, he will perform 
the task of identifying the possible referent(s) of the indexical you, he will carry out the 
contextually appropriate modifications of meaning of the metaphorically used verb 
trapped and the vague adjective bad, and he will attempt to select or construct the 
appropriate sense of the noun lie. The fact that the initial context includes both the 
                                               
3 A discussion of the explicit and implicit meanings of utterance (1) can be found in Solska 
(forthcoming b). 
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concept POLITICS and the concept GOLF, each making available different assumptions, 
will prevent him from selecting or constructing only one meaning for some of these 
items. Instead, the initial context will make it manifest to him that you, instead of 
referring to the addressee, is used non-deictically and identifies not one but two sets of 
people, namely those who ‘are in politics’ and those who ‘play golf.’ It will also make it 
evident that the noun lie encodes not one but two equally prominent and equally relevant 
concepts: LIE1, pertaining to saying intentional untruths and LIE2, indicating a position 
in which something lies. 
As predicted by the so-called relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure,4 the two 
senses of lie, linked to the two concepts the word encodes, will not be derived 
simultaneously but one by one, with the more accessible meaning emerging first. Since 
the assumptions making up the comprehender’s cognitive environment by this point will 
make it manifest that the first sense to emerge, though valid, is not relevant enough, i.e. 
it does not give him the full range of benefits he can expect (in other words, it is not 
optimally relevant), the comprehender will be compelled to reapply the procedure and 
search for another meaning, which together with (or contrasted with) the first meaning 
will finally satisfy his expectations of relevance. As for the meanings communicated by 
the vague words trapped and bad, they will only be established after the key expression 
lie has been interpreted, and since the word will yield two equally valid interpretations, 
each of these items will be taken to convey two slightly different occasion-specific 
concepts: BAD* and TRAPPED*, applicable to LIE1 on the one hand, and BAD** and 
TRAPPED**, applicable to LIE2 on the other hand. What the comprehender will end up 
constructing is an explicature consisting not of one but of two equally valid propositions, 
given in (19), which means that his new current context will now contain the two 
assumptions given in (20):  
 
(19) a. YOUx GET* TRAPPED* IN ONE BAD* LIE1 AFTER ANOTHER (BAD* 
LIE1). 
b. YOUy GET* TRAPPED** IN ONE BAD** LIE2 AFTER ANOTHER (BAD** 
LIE2). 
(20) a. The speaker believes that politicians get repeatedly hampered because of the 
falsehoods they cannot get away with.  
b. The speaker believes that golf players get repeatedly hampered because of the 
positions of the golf ball they find it hard to cope with. 
 
The comprehension process is unlikely to stop at this point since most comprehenders 
will combine the newly constructed assumptions in (20) with other highly accessible 
assumptions, such as (21), which are grounded in the hearer’s life experience:  
 
(21) People who get repeatedly hampered may find it hard to succeed.  
Getting away with a lie can be difficult. 
People who lie cannot be trusted.  
Some people are better at lying than others. 
                                               
4 “Follow a path of least effort in computing cognitive effects: Test interpretive hypotheses 
(disambiguations, reference resolutions, enrichments, implicatures, etc.) in order of accessibility. 
[…] Stop when your expectations of relevance are satisfied (or abandoned)” (Wilson & Sperber 
2004, 613). 
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Tackling a bad lie of a golf ball requires skill.  
Some golfers are better at tackling bad lies than others. 
 
These assumptions can be used as implicated premises allowing the addressee to derive a 
whole range of (weakly) implied meanings, such as those listed in (22a) and (22b), 
which will form yet another context the hearer may use in further processing: 
 
(22) a. Being repeatedly caught lying can damage a politician’s career. 
To achieve success in politics depends on the ability to tell lies.  
Politicians cannot be trusted. 
b. Difficult positions of a golf ball can be a challenge to the golfer. 
Being good at golf depends on learning how to tackle bad lies. 
Not everyone can be good at golf. 
 
At this point some comprehenders might stop but some might go even further and start 
deriving totally emergent meanings, such as the ones in (23), which are neither directly 
stated by utterance (1) nor directly inferable from it, meanings which the speaker may 
but does not have to endorse yet which are perfectly possible in the light of the 
assumptions that have by this stage been derived, and which can be used in the 
processing of whatever utterances the comprehender may encounter next.  
 
(23) A successful politician must be good at lying.  
Politicians enjoy lying. 
For politicians lying is a game. 
Politics is a game. 
 
As can be seen, any assumption that is in some way salient can become a contextual 
assumption and can interact with the ongoing material to yield another assumption that 
will modify the hearer’s cognitive environment by producing a cognitive effect, which is 
by necessity a contextual effect, since it too can be used in the interpretation process to 
follow.  
Arguably, the analysis presented above cannot be applied to all puns considering the 
structural diversity they exhibit and the different communicative settings in which they 
appear. Obviously, a different initial context will be available to a person who has just 
read the name on the box containing a board game, such as (24), to someone who will 
spot the sign (25) over a launderette, to someone exposed to the advertising slogan in 
(4), repeated here as (26), or to someone who will read the title of a book in (27) or a 
newspaper headline in (28): 
 
(24) Merchant of Venus. (The name of a board game) 
(25) Wish You Wash Here. (The name of a laundrette) 
(26) Everybody kneads it. (An advertising slogan for Pillsbury flour) 
(27) Barry Trotter and the Shameless Parody. (A parody of J. K. Rowling’s Harry Potter 
series) 
(28) Science Friction. (A headline of an article about an argument between scientists and 
the British government on the topic of mad cow disease) 
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Nonetheless, in these cases too the general mechanism will be the same. The context that 
will be available to the comprehender from the start will include an expectation that the 
utterance he has encountered will achieve relevance by conveying information about the 
nature of whatever it accompanies: in (24), about what might be involved in the game, in 
(25), about the kind of activity that is conducted on the premises, in (26), about the 
product being advertised, and finally in (27) and (28), about the subject matter (or 
context-content) of respectively the book or the article. In these cases too the hearer will 
process the utterance against the background information made available by the concepts 
associated with the words and expressions used in the utterance and whatever 
information it will allow the addressee to retrieve from memory. Unlike in (1), the 
linguistic material surrounding the connectors in (24) – (28) does not render the 
utterances ambiguous. Still there is a good reason why they have been chosen instead of 
other expressions, for instance such as the ones in (29) – (33) below. The phonetic 
information made available by the concepts they encode together with the information 
conveyed by the co-text in which they appear allows the comprehender to retrieve from 
memory the words and expressions (Venice, wash, needs, Harry Potter and fiction) 
which may or may not have direct bearing on ‘what the utterance is about’ but which 
will trigger contextual effects of their own making the comprehender unable to ignore 
them. 
 
(29) ? Merchant of Mars.  
(30) ? Wish You Launder Here. 
(31) ? Everybody makes dough with it. 
(32) ? Barnabas Trott and the Shameless Parody.  
(33) ? Science Dissension.  
 
As has been seen, though it is the comprehender who constructs the constantly evolving 
contexts in an attempt to derive an optimally relevant interpretation, he does so on the 
basis of the speaker’s ostensive behaviour. After all, he cannot help treating all 
ostensive, i.e. deliberately produced, linguistic signals, whether spoken or written, as 
evidence that the communicator intends to convey a certain meaning. Thus, even though 
the communicator cannot present the hearer with the best possible context he can cue 
that context by providing him with linguistic and non-linguistic stimuli that will make it 
possible to identify whatever he intends to communicate.  
 
 
6. The comprehender’s cognitive environment and the ‘connecting’ 
qualities of the connector 
 
Having discussed the ‘disjuncting’ role of the hearer’s cognitive environment, i.e. its role 
in deriving and retaining the pun’s two meanings, let us move on to identify the roots of 
the ‘connecting’ role of the pun’s connector, i.e. to establish the linguistic basis for the 
correlation of two meanings in one form. To do so we need to take a closer look at the 
conceptual information which is conveyed by the pivotal expression and since puns can 
be based on different types of ambiguity, we need to establish what makes the pivots’s 
conceptual content different in each case.  
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Relevance theorists take the view (Sperber & Wilson 1986/1995: 92) that concepts 
encoded by words and expressions give the comprehender access to three types of 
information, stored in the three entries of each concept: (i) the information about the 
phonetic and grammatical properties of the word or expression realizing the concept 
(which is accessed via the concept’s lexical entry), (ii) the information about the 
concept’s logical properties amounting to its proper definition (which is accessed via the 
concept’s logical entry), and (iii) the encyclopedic knowledge about the extension and/or 
denotation of the concept (accessed via its encyclopedic entry), which also includes folk 
and specialist assumptions, cultural beliefs and personal experiences.  
As I argued elsewhere (Solska forthcoming a), depending on the type of ambiguity 
exhibited by the connector in a specific pun, at least five different pairings of concepts 
communicated by a pun’s connector can be identified. These pairings are shown in the 
diagrams below, each of them specifying what kind of ostensive signal can be used as a 
punning element and which parts of the conceptual content of the two concepts 
communicated by that element are common to both of them.  
The diagrams focus on two major details: the nature of the ostensive signal used and 
the conceptual information made manifest by that signal. In each case a few words of 
comment are offered about the kind of contextual cueing which makes a specific 
outcome possible. In the diagrams, both channels: written and spoken, have been taken 
into account. Obviously, speech is the primary medium through which language is 
expressed and the orthographic form of a word is not part of the lexical entry of a 
concept. However there are utterances whose punning qualities become apparent only in 
writing, since in many cases it is the graphic shape of the ostensive signal that makes one 
realize that the utterance is a pun, especially when non-standard spellings are involved, 
as in (34) and (35): 
 
(34) Bingo Hall Worker B-10 And Robbed. [B-10/beaten] 
(35) Skolars need glasses. (Advertising slogan for Skol beer) (Bielski 1999: 39) 
 
As for the symbols used in the diagrams, a single headed arrow identifies the concept or 
concepts which are made available by the ostensive signal used. A double-headed arrow 
represents the comprehender’s oscillation between the two concepts. The shaded 
sections in each diagram and the equation mark (=) placed between the corresponding 
entries of the two concepts indicate which aspects of the conceptual information are the 
ones the two concepts have in common. The ‘almost equal to’ symbol (≈) indicates that 
the corresponding entries of the two concepts have some but not all aspects of their 
content in common. Finally, the lack of identity between corresponding concept entries 
is marked by the inequality symbol (≠).  
 
 
5.1 Puns based on homonymy 
 
As shown in diagram 1, in puns based on homonymy, such as (1), or on polysemy, such 
as (2), the distinct concepts the addressee will be led to juxtapose share the lexical entry, 
i.e. the entry specifying the phonetic structure and grammatical properties of the lexical 
item encoding a concept. However, their logical addresses are different and they provide 
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access to different sets of encyclopedic data.5 In the case of such puns the oscillating 
effect will arise regardless of whether the utterance is produced in speech or in writing. 
 
OSTENSIVE SIGNAL: <lie> or /laI/ 
                                          
CONCEPTS CONVEYED: 
CONCEPT1 
e.g. LIE1 
 
CONCEPT2 
e.g. LIE2 
LEXICAL ENTRY1 = LEXICAL ENTRY2 
LOGICAL ENTRY1 ≠ LOGICAL ENTRY2 
ENCYCLOPEDIC ENTRY1 ≠ ENCYCLOPEDIC ENTRY2 
 
Diagram 1: The pairings of concepts conveyed by the connector in homonymy- and 
polysemy-based puns. 
 
Whether a homonymy- or polysemy-based pun will be detected or not depends on the 
trivial factor of the addresser’s familiarity with the particular meanings of the linguistic 
expressions used. For instance, a person unfamiliar with the slang meaning of canned, 
say, someone who is not a totally proficient speaker of English, may fail to see the pun 
in (36). 
 
(36) I used to work for Budweiser but I got canned.  
 
However, it would seem that punsters tend to provide enough cueing for the 
comprehenders so that if one of the meanings conveyed by the connector is not known, 
or unlikely to be accessed, or at least not readily available, the assumptions made 
available by the linguistic or non-linguistic material surrounding the key word will make 
it easy to infer the other meaning. For instance, though most people may lack the 
encyclopedic knowledge of what a Mobius strip is,6 the presence of the concept 
MATHEMATICIAN in utterance (37) would allow even a complete layman to guess 
that the unknown word Mobius should be understood as ‘having something to do with 
mathematics.’ In (38), the less obvious meaning of the key word drive, i.e. ‘driveway,’ is 
brought to the attention of the interpreter by the accompanying photograph, showing a 
Mazda car parked on a driveway leading to a mansion house. 
 
(37) “Where do mathematicians go on weekends?” “To a Mobius strip club!” 
(38) The perfect car for a long drive – Mazda car. (Tanaka 1992: 77) 
                                               
5 The distinction between the two is drawn based on the etymological relatedness between the 
senses of a word in the case of polysemy and the lack thereof in the case of homonymy, and is 
thus of little value in a synchronic study, such as this one. 
6 The term Mobius strip refers to a surface which has only one side and only one boundary and has 
been named after a German mathematician who was the first to describe its mathematical 
properties. 
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5.2 Puns based on metaphor 
 
It would seem that in puns juxtaposing the connector’s metaphorical and literal meaning, 
which is what happens in (3), one of the meanings which are brought into contrast 
should be retrieved in the process of linguistic decoding while the other one, in keeping 
with the relevance-theoretic position on how metaphorical meanings arise (cf. Carston 
2002: 349-356), should be inferentially constructed in the process of meaning adjustment 
in which the lexically given concept will become broadened and/or narrowed, so as to 
convey the unlexicalised ad hoc concept(s) envisioned by the speaker. Thus, for 
instance, while deriving the contextually appropriate meaning of the predicate dying in 
(3), the addressee should extend the category of entities which can die, i.e. which can 
reach the end of their existence, so as to include commercial companies which can cease 
to function in the business world and to exclude those entities that can stop being alive 
(e.g. human beings). However a close examination of metaphors used in puns reveals 
general absence of novel metaphors. As can be seen in examples (39) – (44) below, the 
metaphorical meanings involved are conventional, i.e. they are on the way to becoming 
or have become lexicalised.  
 
(39) Have you heard of the online origami store? It folded. 
(40) The Alpine Skiing competition started poorly and went downhill from there. 
(41) Burning Questions on Tunnel Safety Unanswered. (A headline of an article in The 
Guardian on the possibility of fires in the Channel tunnel) 
(42) [A] trial tow of a 6.5 million-ton iceberg would cost about $ 10 million – a sum that 
chilled inverstors. (The Time July 4, 2011) 
(43) Love is blind but I am not. 
(44) I’m going to be discussing global warming next week, it’s quite a heated topic. 
 
This might indicate that metaphor-based puns are in fact polysemous in nature and the 
derivation of the two concepts in such puns is in fact very much like the derivation of the 
two concepts in other polysemous puns in that they all exploit an extra encoded sense of 
the connector. Only for the comprehenders who have not encountered the metaphors 
involved would interpreting such puns involve constructing an appropriate ad hoc 
concept. The common roots of the two concepts in metaphor-based puns are reflected in 
the conceptual information communicated by the connector. As shown in Diagram 2, the 
end result is that the two concepts contrasted are identical not only in terms of their 
lexical entries: their logical and their encyclopedic entries overlap. Again the connector 
can successfully do its job regardless of the medium in which the pun is conveyed. 
 
OSTENSIVE SIGNAL: <dying> or /daIIŋ/ 
                                          
CONCEPTS 
CONVEYED: 
CONCEPT1 
e.g. DIE 
 
CONCEPT2 
e.g. DIE* 
LEXICAL ENTRY1 = LEXICAL ENTRY2 
 LOGICAL ENTRY1 ≈ LOGICAL ENTRY2  
 ENCYCLOPEDIC ENTRY1 ≈ ENCYCLOPEDIC ENTRY2  
 
Diagram 2: The pairings of concepts conveyed by the connector in metaphor-based puns. 
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5.3 Puns based on perfect homophony 
 
In puns based on perfect homophony the punning element acting as the ostensive signal 
will yield a punning effect regardless of whether the utterance is presented in speech or 
in writing. However, which of the two concepts will be accessed first will depend on 
whether the addressee will first read or hear the pun, which is why diagram 3, showing 
the conceptual content of such puns, appears in two versions. It may be observed that in 
puns of this sort the punning element does in fact encode only one concept which, if the 
pun is to be detected, will have to be contrasted with the concept encoded by another 
identically or similar sounding yet unexpressed ‘target’ expression, which the hearer first 
has to identify. For instance, the reader of (4) and (8) above will only see the pun if he 
identifies the identically sounding word needs and rains respectively. Similarly, the 
hearer of (4) and (8) will only see the pun if he identifies the identically sounding word 
kneads and reigns respectively. As shown in Diagrams 3a and 3b, in puns based on 
perfect homonymy the distinct concepts the addressee is supposed to identify share only 
a fragment of their lexical entries, namely the part specifying the phonetic form of their 
linguistic counterparts, yet their logical and encyclopedic entries are different.  
 
OSTENSIVE SIGNAL: <kneads> 
    
CONCEPTS 
CONVEYED: 
CONCEPT1 
ENCODED CONCEPT  
e.g. KNEADS 
 
CONCEPT2 
TARGET CONCEPT 
e.g. NEEDS  
LEXICAL 
ENTRY1 
PHONETIC  
INFORMATION 
= 
PHONETIC  
INFORMATION LEXICAL 
ENTRY2 GRAMMATICAL 
INFORMATION 
≠ 
GRAMMATICAL 
INFORMATION 
LOGICAL ENTRY1 ≠ LOGICAL ENTRY2 
ENCYCLOPEDIC ENTRY1 ≠ ENCYCLOPEDIC ENTRY2 
Diagram 3a: The pairings of concepts conveyed by the connector in puns based on 
perfect homophony, when presented in writing. 
 
 
OSTENSIVE SIGNAL: /ni:dz/ 
    
CONCEPTS 
CONVEYED: 
CONCEPT1 
ENCODED CONCEPT  
e.g. NEEDS 
 
CONCEPT2 
TARGET CONCEPT 
e.g. KNEADS 
LEXICAL 
ENTRY 
PHONETIC  
INFORMATION 
= 
PHONETIC  
INFORMATION LEXICAL 
ENTRY GRAMMATICAL 
INFORMATION 
≠ 
GRAMMATICAL 
INFORMATION 
LOGICAL ENTRY ≠ LOGICAL ENTRY 
ENCYCLOPEDIC ENTRY ≠ ENCYCLOPEDIC ENTRY 
Diagram 3b: The pairings of concepts conveyed by the connector in puns based on 
perfect homophony, when presented in speech. 
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5.4 Puns based on imperfect homophony and on paronymy 
 
As shown in Diagram 4, in puns based on imperfect homonymy and on paronymy, the 
distinct concepts involved have even less in common than in the case of perfect 
homonyms: they share only a fragment of the phonetic form of their linguistic 
counterparts. Puns like this resemble puns based on perfect homophony in that their 
connectors too encode only one concept. However, unlike in puns based on perfect 
homophony, in which the two meanings emerge in the order determined by whether the 
ostensive signal is graphic or acoustic, the concept encoded by the connector will be 
accessed first regardless of the medium of transmission. The target concept will only be 
identified and the pun detected if the hearer’s cognitive environment contains the 
pertinent information allowing him to identify the virtual member of the brace of 
concepts. Characteristically, the linguistic material surrounding the connector in such 
puns contains fragments of idioms or set phraseologies, or makes references to proverbs, 
titles of books and films. Most members of a given speech community will have in their 
memory the titles of many books, movies, TV shows, etc. as well as a long list of 
proverbs and sayings, which is why so many of them get repeatedly reused. The title of 
Shakespeare’s comedy The Merchant of Venice has inspired both the name of the shop in 
(45) and the name of a board game in (24), repeated here as (46). The title of the movie 
Planet of the Apes is involved in both the name of a wine shop in (47) and a video rental 
place in (48), and the echo of the proverb It never rains but pours can be found in 
advertising slogans (49), (50) and (51): 
 
(45) Merchant of Tennis. (The name of a shop selling sports equipment) 
(46) Merchant of Venus. (The name of a board game) 
(47) Planet of the Grapes. (Name of a wine store) 
(48) Planet of the Tapes. (Name of a video rental place) 
(49) When it rains it pours. (The advertising slogan for Morton salt) 
(50) When it pours it reigns. (The advertising slogan for Michelin tyres) 
(51) We’ve poured throughout her reign. (The advertising slogan for Guinness beer, 
which appeared in the year of Queen Elisabeth II’s Silver Jubilee) (Redfern 1984: 
134) 
 
OSTENSIVE SIGNAL: <Venus> or /'vi:ns/ 
    
CONCEPTS 
CONVEYED: 
CONCEPT1 
ENCODED CONCEPT  
e.g. VENUS 
 
CONCEPT2 
TARGET CONCEPT  
e.g. VENICE 
LEXICAL 
ENTRY1 
 
PHONETIC  
INFORMATION 
≈ 
PHONETIC  
INFORMATION 
 
LEXICAL 
ENTRY2 GRAMMATICAL 
INFORMATION 
≠ 
GRAMMATICAL 
INFORMATION 
LOGICAL ENTRY1 ≠ LOGICAL ENTRY2 
ENCYCLOPEDIC ENTRY1 ≠ ENCYCLOPEDIC ENTRY2 
 
Diagram 4: The pairings of concepts conveyed by the connector in puns based on 
imperfect homophony and on paronymy. 
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5.5 Puns based on homography  
 
Puns based on homography only work in texts conveyed in the written form (such as 
advertising slogans used in pictorial ads, names of shops and businesses, titles of books, 
newspaper headlines etc), as in their case the ostensive signal is the orthographic form of 
the word. Horizontal homography-based puns, such as (52), do not survive in speech: the 
two occurrences of the connector item are then perceived as imperfect homophones.  
 
(52) I enjoy bass fishing and playing the bass guitar. 
 
Given the generally accepted belief in the primacy of speech over writing, it is not 
surprising that homographic puns are often not seen as puns proper. This is the view 
taken by Sobkowiak (1991: 13), who contrasts such “‘printed’ puns” with “true puns,” 
which for him are “in their mass, a decidedly spoken phenomenon.” Koestler (1978: 
144), who observes that “in the pun, two strings of thought are tangled into one acoustic 
knot,” does not even acknowledge the existence of homographic puns. 
However, given their widespread use and the fact that the mechanism which is at 
work is the same as in the case of other puns, homographic puns too seem to merit 
consideration. As shown in Diagrams 5a and 5b, what sets them off from other puns is 
the fact that the concepts which are brought into contrast are in fact encoded by different 
words, which by definition have different lexical, logical and encyclopedic entries, but 
which merely happen to be associated with the same graphic form. Which of the two 
concepts is accessed first (and is thus represented as CONCEPT1) depends of which word 
is actually encountered at a given point in the utterance 
 
OSTENSIVE SIGNAL: <bass> 
    
CONCEPTS 
CONVEYED: 
CONCEPT1 
ENCODED CONCEPT  
e.g. BASS (=LOW PITCH) 
 
CONCEPT2 
TARGET CONCEPT  
e.g. BASS (=FISH) 
LEXICAL 
ENTRY1 
PHONETIC  
INFORMATION 
≠ 
PHONETIC  
INFORMATION LEXICAL 
ENTRY2 GRAMMATICAL 
INFORMATION 
≠ 
GRAMMATICAL 
INFORMATION 
LOGICAL ENTRY1 ≠ LOGICAL ENTRY2 
ENCYCLOPEDIC ENTRY1 ≠ ENCYCLOPEDIC ENTRY2 
 
Diagram 5a: One possible pairing of (words and) concepts conveyed by the connector 
in homography-based puns, when presented in writing. 
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OSTENSIVE SIGNAL: <bass> 
    
CONCEPTS 
CONVEYED: 
CONCEPT1 
ENCODED CONCEPT  
e.g. BASS (=FISH) 
 
CONCEPT2 
TARGET CONCEPT  
e.g. BASS (=LOW PITCH) 
LEXICAL 
ENTRY 
PHONETIC  
INFORMATION 
≠ 
PHONETIC  
INFORMATION LEXICAL 
ENTRY GRAMMATICAL 
INFORMATION 
≠ 
GRAMMATICAL 
INFORMATION 
LOGICAL ENTRY ≠ LOGICAL ENTRY 
ENCYCLOPEDIC ENTRY ≠ ENCYCLOPEDIC ENTRY 
 
Diagram 5b: The other possible pairing of (words and) concepts conveyed by the 
connector in homography-based puns, when presented in writing. 
 
 
7. Concluding remarks  
 
Considering the fundamental role context plays in utterance comprehension in general, it 
is not surprising that it also acts as a key factor in interpreting puns. The role of 
contextual factors in pun comprehension has always been acknowledged by researchers 
investigating puns and has been reflected in Attardo’s (1994) not entirely successful 
attempt to account for what he saw as the defining properties of punning utterances, 
namely the ‘disjunction of meaning’ and the ‘conjunction of form.’ I hope that the 
analysis presented above has demonstrated that in contrast to approaches grounded in a 
limited mechanistic vision of context, such as Attardo’s, the cognitive model of context 
proposed within the relevance-theoretic framework is better equipped to explain how the 
ostensive signals chosen by communicator and the assumptions that gradually become 
manifest to the comprehender affect the way the comprehender of a pun constructs a 
context that will allow him to recognize the punning intention of the communicator, to 
establish and juxtapose the pun’s two meanings as well as derive whatever cognitive 
effects these meanings may trigger. 
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